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The coordinated attack by
knife-wielding aggressors in Kunming, China in March of this year, led to the deaths of dozens
of people. Chinese authorities were quick to accuse Uighur separatists
from Xinjiang, with Beijing referring to incident as “an organized, premeditated violent terrorist attack.”
Terrorist attacks by Uighur dissidents are not a new phenomenon in
China, although few have resulted in such a high death toll. It is still
unclear whether individuals from Xinjiang are behind the attack, yet
for the purposes of this piece this point is secondary. What deserves
attention is why Chinese authorities utilize the Uighur threat as the
go-to cause in cases of domestic terrorism. The Uighur issue is seen as prominent
threat to Beijing, with Hu Jintao presiding over the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in 2004, stating that “we have to fight against the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism.”
Using this rhetoric of the three evils, China has sought to
characterize the Xinjiang border region as one beset by ethnic
nationalism informed by radical Islam, spurring violent separatism.
“Chinese-ness” under threat
Uighurs are often characterized as a
foreign element residing within the Chinese state. Moreover, many
Uighurs do not self-identify with key elements of “Chinese-ness” as
perpetuated by Beijing. Their status as non-ethnic Han Chinese
individuals already in many ways positions them outside of Beijing’s
vision of itself; namely as the successor of an expanded, Han-dominated,
Central Kingdom.This tendency to emphasise the otherness of the Uighur is noted by Blaine Kaltman in her book, Under the Heal of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime and the Uighur in China. Kaltman
conducted interviews throughout China on the Uighur issue and
consistently found that, “among Han, Xinjiang has a reputation for being
dangerous and primitive because of its Uighur population…I heard Han of
all backgrounds refer to the Uighur problem. [The Han are]…usually
quick to say that Uighur are criminals and uninterested in in
assimilating into Han society.”
foreign element residing within the Chinese state. Moreover, many
Uighurs do not self-identify with key elements of “Chinese-ness” as
perpetuated by Beijing. Their status as non-ethnic Han Chinese
individuals already in many ways positions them outside of Beijing’s
vision of itself; namely as the successor of an expanded, Han-dominated,
Central Kingdom.This tendency to emphasise the otherness of the Uighur is noted by Blaine Kaltman in her book, Under the Heal of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime and the Uighur in China. Kaltman
conducted interviews throughout China on the Uighur issue and
consistently found that, “among Han, Xinjiang has a reputation for being
dangerous and primitive because of its Uighur population…I heard Han of
all backgrounds refer to the Uighur problem. [The Han are]…usually
quick to say that Uighur are criminals and uninterested in in
assimilating into Han society.”
The issue of national identity is an
important one, as Chinese considerations of Xinjiang ultimately stem
from efforts to bolster the idea of “Chinese-ness” in order to maintain
nationalist sentiments throughout the country which support Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rule. Such efforts are doubly important in border
areas and other autonomous administrative regions such as Xinjiang,
where ethnic, cultural and religious minorities are focused.
important one, as Chinese considerations of Xinjiang ultimately stem
from efforts to bolster the idea of “Chinese-ness” in order to maintain
nationalist sentiments throughout the country which support Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rule. Such efforts are doubly important in border
areas and other autonomous administrative regions such as Xinjiang,
where ethnic, cultural and religious minorities are focused.
| Xinjiang Borders most of Central Asia Photo Credit: wsws.org |
To a large extent, much of the unrest in
Xinjiang stems from Uighur discontent concerning the pace of economic
growth, inequality and the encroachment of mass Han migration into the
area. These sources of discontent have over the years led to a series of
uprisings and riots in Xinjiang, notably in 1996 and in 2009 (when 197 people were killed).
Such unrest constitutes a direct threat to the CCP’s effort to realize
Hu Jintao’s philosophy of a “harmonious society [and] harmonious world. The new administration under Xi Jinping
remains in the same position as former CCP administrations with regards
to Chinese territorial and societal integrity; with the threat of the
Uighurs remaining at the forefront of Beijing’s domestic considerations. Despite the reality that Uighur
individuals and groups have conducted terrorist attack in China, Beijing
has long employed hyperbolic rhetoric and questionable claims in order
to portray regional discontent emanating from Xinjiang as the result of a
coherent plan by a nefarious organization.
Xinjiang stems from Uighur discontent concerning the pace of economic
growth, inequality and the encroachment of mass Han migration into the
area. These sources of discontent have over the years led to a series of
uprisings and riots in Xinjiang, notably in 1996 and in 2009 (when 197 people were killed).
Such unrest constitutes a direct threat to the CCP’s effort to realize
Hu Jintao’s philosophy of a “harmonious society [and] harmonious world. The new administration under Xi Jinping
remains in the same position as former CCP administrations with regards
to Chinese territorial and societal integrity; with the threat of the
Uighurs remaining at the forefront of Beijing’s domestic considerations. Despite the reality that Uighur
individuals and groups have conducted terrorist attack in China, Beijing
has long employed hyperbolic rhetoric and questionable claims in order
to portray regional discontent emanating from Xinjiang as the result of a
coherent plan by a nefarious organization.
| Demonstrators during the 2009 Uprising Photo Credit: The Telegraph |
Counter-Terrorism in China and Beyond
Following 9/11, China utilized the new
mandate of the War on Terror to legitimize such claims. For instance,
the 2002 State Council Information Office report entitled “East Turkestan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity,”
claimed that that all 200 attacks during the 1990s were the product of a
single coordinated group. This claim was patently false, due to the use
of the ill-defined term “East Turkestan forces” as well as the fact
that no Uighur group claimed responsibility for any of the attacks. Similarly, China overestimated the
influence of Al-Qaeda in Xinjiang, after erroneously claiming that all
attacks in Xinjiang were linked to the organization. Beijing sought to
capitalize on the US-led global War on Terror to link all East Turkestan
organizations to Al-Qaeda, despite them “being mostly inspired by
secular or moderate Muslim ideologies,” according to Marlene Laurelle
and Sebastien Peyrouse.
mandate of the War on Terror to legitimize such claims. For instance,
the 2002 State Council Information Office report entitled “East Turkestan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity,”
claimed that that all 200 attacks during the 1990s were the product of a
single coordinated group. This claim was patently false, due to the use
of the ill-defined term “East Turkestan forces” as well as the fact
that no Uighur group claimed responsibility for any of the attacks. Similarly, China overestimated the
influence of Al-Qaeda in Xinjiang, after erroneously claiming that all
attacks in Xinjiang were linked to the organization. Beijing sought to
capitalize on the US-led global War on Terror to link all East Turkestan
organizations to Al-Qaeda, despite them “being mostly inspired by
secular or moderate Muslim ideologies,” according to Marlene Laurelle
and Sebastien Peyrouse.
China has been hard at work in creating a
regional framework under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to
deal with the Uighur issue. The SCO owes its existence overwhelmingly
to the internationalization of Chinese domestic issues and Beijing’s
corresponding concerns, claims senior Security Studies research, Stephen
Aris; “which [were] a very strong motivating factor behind China’s
promotion of the SCO mechanism…indeed [the] SCO can be seen to have its
origins in China’s Xinjiang problem.”
regional framework under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to
deal with the Uighur issue. The SCO owes its existence overwhelmingly
to the internationalization of Chinese domestic issues and Beijing’s
corresponding concerns, claims senior Security Studies research, Stephen
Aris; “which [were] a very strong motivating factor behind China’s
promotion of the SCO mechanism…indeed [the] SCO can be seen to have its
origins in China’s Xinjiang problem.”
The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS)
was created by SCO members in 2002. RATS is a multilateral security
agreement that creates detailed security commitments between SCO member
states. Specifically, the primary goal of RATS is the “coordination of
non-military actions relevant to addressing the sub-state security
threats of terrorism, separatism, [and] extremism. Through the RATS
framework and by signing extradition treaties with neighbouring
countries, China has expanded its domestic “anti-Uighur” focus into the
international realm. This has allowed Beijing, both within and beyond
its borders, to incarcerate individuals it deems troublesome.
was created by SCO members in 2002. RATS is a multilateral security
agreement that creates detailed security commitments between SCO member
states. Specifically, the primary goal of RATS is the “coordination of
non-military actions relevant to addressing the sub-state security
threats of terrorism, separatism, [and] extremism. Through the RATS
framework and by signing extradition treaties with neighbouring
countries, China has expanded its domestic “anti-Uighur” focus into the
international realm. This has allowed Beijing, both within and beyond
its borders, to incarcerate individuals it deems troublesome.
| SCO Member state Military Representatives in Committee Photo Credit: people.com.cn |
China’s Increasing Reach
The case of Huseiyn Celil demonstrates this trend perfectly.
Celil, a Canadian citizen and Uighur political activist, was arrested
in Uzbekistan and extradited to China while visiting his family in March
2006. Celil’s arrest was made at the request of the Chinese government,
and Uzbekistan extradited him to China where he was sentenced to life
imprisonment in June 2006.According to Chinese authorities, Celil
was alleged to belong to the East Turkestan Liberation Organization.
China ignored efforts by the Canadian government to secure his release,
arguing that they did not acknowledge his Canadian citizenship, claiming
that he left Xinjiang illegally (as a refugee) in the early 1990s.
Celil, a Canadian citizen and Uighur political activist, was arrested
in Uzbekistan and extradited to China while visiting his family in March
2006. Celil’s arrest was made at the request of the Chinese government,
and Uzbekistan extradited him to China where he was sentenced to life
imprisonment in June 2006.According to Chinese authorities, Celil
was alleged to belong to the East Turkestan Liberation Organization.
China ignored efforts by the Canadian government to secure his release,
arguing that they did not acknowledge his Canadian citizenship, claiming
that he left Xinjiang illegally (as a refugee) in the early 1990s.
Similarly, in August 2009 under pressure
from China, the Kyrgyz government arrested Dilmurat Akbarov, the
chairman of the Kyrgyz Peoples’ Uighur Friendship Society Ittipak and
his deputy Jamaldin Nasirov. Akbarov’s group was protesting Chinese
actions in Xinjiang during the 2009 unrest, and his arrest coincided
with the Chinese crackdown during the same period.
from China, the Kyrgyz government arrested Dilmurat Akbarov, the
chairman of the Kyrgyz Peoples’ Uighur Friendship Society Ittipak and
his deputy Jamaldin Nasirov. Akbarov’s group was protesting Chinese
actions in Xinjiang during the 2009 unrest, and his arrest coincided
with the Chinese crackdown during the same period.
A similar trend has occurred with
Beijing seeking to silence domestic critics such as Ilham Tohti, a
Beijing-based professor who is critical of China’s ethnic policies.
Professor Tohti has been under arrest for over a month on spurious
allegations of advocating separatism, and his arrest appears, according
the U.S. State Department “to
be part of a disturbing pattern of arrests and detentions of public
interest lawyers, Internet activists, journalists, religious leaders and
others who peacefully challenge official Chinese policies and actions.”
Beijing seeking to silence domestic critics such as Ilham Tohti, a
Beijing-based professor who is critical of China’s ethnic policies.
Professor Tohti has been under arrest for over a month on spurious
allegations of advocating separatism, and his arrest appears, according
the U.S. State Department “to
be part of a disturbing pattern of arrests and detentions of public
interest lawyers, Internet activists, journalists, religious leaders and
others who peacefully challenge official Chinese policies and actions.”
China does indeed suffer from a string
of domestic terrorist attacks, perpetrated by individuals who have
co-opted the often legitimate concerns and frustrations of the Uighur
people, yet it is important to put such attacks in context.The Uighur threat is not as monolithic
and insidious as Beijing claims, yet at the same time the central
government’s hardline stance, while often excessive and crude, stems in
large part from its duty to protect civilians. What remains difficult to
determine is to what degree such efforts to protect the polity are
accented with policies designed to primarily protect the ruling party.
of domestic terrorist attacks, perpetrated by individuals who have
co-opted the often legitimate concerns and frustrations of the Uighur
people, yet it is important to put such attacks in context.The Uighur threat is not as monolithic
and insidious as Beijing claims, yet at the same time the central
government’s hardline stance, while often excessive and crude, stems in
large part from its duty to protect civilians. What remains difficult to
determine is to what degree such efforts to protect the polity are
accented with policies designed to primarily protect the ruling party.
Note: This piece was originally published as “China’s Uighur Reality” at www.freedomobservatory.org, whose editors are to be accorded all credit for the hyperlinks and minor edits.