The number
one motivation behind China’s anti-corruption efforts is domestic
stability. Whenever corruption has seeped into a dynasty, be it the Han
(220 AD) – as vividly detailed in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms – or
the Qing (1911) with its scheming mandarins, the ruling regime lost the
mandate of heaven and fell. This not merely a colourful aside:
historical memory deeply informs the thinking of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP).
one motivation behind China’s anti-corruption efforts is domestic
stability. Whenever corruption has seeped into a dynasty, be it the Han
(220 AD) – as vividly detailed in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms – or
the Qing (1911) with its scheming mandarins, the ruling regime lost the
mandate of heaven and fell. This not merely a colourful aside:
historical memory deeply informs the thinking of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP).
Targeting
corrupt actors falls perfectly in line with previous CCP rhetoric
regarding the need to root out land owners, saboteurs, hoarders of rice,
and other leeches on national productivity. These sentiments were in
turn informed by the harsh attitudes against extortionate land lords and
officials, as well as bandits; the twin plagues of internal discord
during imperial China. Thus anti-corruption efforts and language find
ample precedence in Chinese history and national memory.
corrupt actors falls perfectly in line with previous CCP rhetoric
regarding the need to root out land owners, saboteurs, hoarders of rice,
and other leeches on national productivity. These sentiments were in
turn informed by the harsh attitudes against extortionate land lords and
officials, as well as bandits; the twin plagues of internal discord
during imperial China. Thus anti-corruption efforts and language find
ample precedence in Chinese history and national memory.
Maintaining
public support is paramount for the CCP, especially as it has shed it
ideological trappings, and is in certain ways looking for new meaning.
Moreover, the CCP needs to stave off the doubts of the Chinese public
which question the CCP’s relevance in the 21st
century. Consequently, the CCP has to bill itself as the most effective
public administrator. If the CCP can instill confidence in the public,
then they can dissuade them from considering untested alternative
governing options.
public support is paramount for the CCP, especially as it has shed it
ideological trappings, and is in certain ways looking for new meaning.
Moreover, the CCP needs to stave off the doubts of the Chinese public
which question the CCP’s relevance in the 21st
century. Consequently, the CCP has to bill itself as the most effective
public administrator. If the CCP can instill confidence in the public,
then they can dissuade them from considering untested alternative
governing options.
The
way the CCP maintains this legitimacy is by demonstrating the economic
bounty that its stewardship has bestowed upon the people. By placating
the population’s materialistic needs, the CCP has in the decades since
Mao’s death diverted public attention and energy into economic, and away
from political matters. Following Deng Xiaoping’s mantra that “[t]o get rich is glorious”
and more recently Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”, the CCP has focused on
improving quality of life. Having lifted hundreds of millions out of
subsistence level poverty, Beijing has directed the population’s efforts
into national building.
way the CCP maintains this legitimacy is by demonstrating the economic
bounty that its stewardship has bestowed upon the people. By placating
the population’s materialistic needs, the CCP has in the decades since
Mao’s death diverted public attention and energy into economic, and away
from political matters. Following Deng Xiaoping’s mantra that “[t]o get rich is glorious”
and more recently Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”, the CCP has focused on
improving quality of life. Having lifted hundreds of millions out of
subsistence level poverty, Beijing has directed the population’s efforts
into national building.
Guilty vs. Guilty by Association
There
are two broad categories of corruption in China: a) corruption directly
related to CCP policies and party organs, and b) corruption which comes
about in due course in countries which experience rapid growth and
demonstrate insufficient civil society and public accountability.
are two broad categories of corruption in China: a) corruption directly
related to CCP policies and party organs, and b) corruption which comes
about in due course in countries which experience rapid growth and
demonstrate insufficient civil society and public accountability.
With
regards to the first category, as long as Chinese citizens are
experiencing on-going improvements in their lives, they are willing to
tolerate Beijing’s heavy handed social and political policies. Yet
with slowing growth, both Beijing and the populace are seeking
scapegoats. Admittedly, there is widespread corruption in China,
especially surrounding government programs such as the one-child policy, urban-rural residency permits, underground churches, and black market medical care.
regards to the first category, as long as Chinese citizens are
experiencing on-going improvements in their lives, they are willing to
tolerate Beijing’s heavy handed social and political policies. Yet
with slowing growth, both Beijing and the populace are seeking
scapegoats. Admittedly, there is widespread corruption in China,
especially surrounding government programs such as the one-child policy, urban-rural residency permits, underground churches, and black market medical care.
All
these sources of corruption, with which the public are forced to deal
with on a daily basis, stem from government policies. Reluctance to
criticize the regime in economic boom times is a common phenomenon, yet
as growth slows and discontent increases, this reluctance disappears.
While China does not broadcast the fact to the greater world, or even to
its own citizens, there are tens of thousands of protests in China
every year. These protests overwhelmingly concern corruption and
pollution.
these sources of corruption, with which the public are forced to deal
with on a daily basis, stem from government policies. Reluctance to
criticize the regime in economic boom times is a common phenomenon, yet
as growth slows and discontent increases, this reluctance disappears.
While China does not broadcast the fact to the greater world, or even to
its own citizens, there are tens of thousands of protests in China
every year. These protests overwhelmingly concern corruption and
pollution.
China’s
massive party apparatus and state-supported economic development put
not just the government, but the CCP itself in the firing line. In the
two areas mentioned previously, the CCP is having to deal with decades
of unaddressed dissatisfaction stemming from China’s ‘growth over
everything’ policies. Reforming the policies which cause this systemic
corruption takes time, and while Beijing is pragmatic and willing, it
cannot openly admit fault: enter anti-corruption scapegoatism. By
publicly announcing its anti-corruption efforts, the CCP distances
itself from the issue as well as engages in a witch-hunt of lower and
mid-tier party officials.
massive party apparatus and state-supported economic development put
not just the government, but the CCP itself in the firing line. In the
two areas mentioned previously, the CCP is having to deal with decades
of unaddressed dissatisfaction stemming from China’s ‘growth over
everything’ policies. Reforming the policies which cause this systemic
corruption takes time, and while Beijing is pragmatic and willing, it
cannot openly admit fault: enter anti-corruption scapegoatism. By
publicly announcing its anti-corruption efforts, the CCP distances
itself from the issue as well as engages in a witch-hunt of lower and
mid-tier party officials.
This tactic often does expose real sources of corruption, thus allowing Beijing to blame ‘a few bad apples‘
for local or provincial corruption; while ignoring the national lack of
accountability and civil society under CCP rule, which created said
systemic corruption in the first place. Highly public anti-corruption
efforts and trials also allow the government to implement reforms as
remedies against corrupt officials, as opposed as solutions to past CCP
failures, thus saving face.
for local or provincial corruption; while ignoring the national lack of
accountability and civil society under CCP rule, which created said
systemic corruption in the first place. Highly public anti-corruption
efforts and trials also allow the government to implement reforms as
remedies against corrupt officials, as opposed as solutions to past CCP
failures, thus saving face.
Xi
Jinping’s recent anti-corruption drive embodies many of these elements,
although it does represent a concerted, and I believe genuine, effort
to stamp out corruption. While there are show-trial elements inherent in
the program, Xi recognizes that championing this cause boosts his
domestic image and support, as well as solidifies his control over
government. Would-be opponents
may think twice, as corruption within their departments or mandates may
see their heads on the block in the name of accountability.
Jinping’s recent anti-corruption drive embodies many of these elements,
although it does represent a concerted, and I believe genuine, effort
to stamp out corruption. While there are show-trial elements inherent in
the program, Xi recognizes that championing this cause boosts his
domestic image and support, as well as solidifies his control over
government. Would-be opponents
may think twice, as corruption within their departments or mandates may
see their heads on the block in the name of accountability.
With
regards to the second type of corruption mentioned above, here the CCP
is – in the eyes of the public – in many cases guilty by association.
Given the widespread integration of party organs in various social
organizations, as well as the predominance of state-run institutions and
companies, corruption in these areas indirectly tarnishes the
government’s image. The public is aware of the connections these
entities have to the government, so any failure by stamp out corruption
ultimately directs discontent back at the regime.
regards to the second type of corruption mentioned above, here the CCP
is – in the eyes of the public – in many cases guilty by association.
Given the widespread integration of party organs in various social
organizations, as well as the predominance of state-run institutions and
companies, corruption in these areas indirectly tarnishes the
government’s image. The public is aware of the connections these
entities have to the government, so any failure by stamp out corruption
ultimately directs discontent back at the regime.
Given
that growth has absolute priority, the government has been more
proactive in its anti-corruption efforts here. This is largely due to
the fact that foreign firms, investors, and governments come into
contact with the above mentioned CCP-linked entities. If China’s
economic actors, and by extension the government is seen as corrupt and
unwilling to tackle those who wrong foreign actors, business confidence
will sink. Beijing cannot allow this to occur, and this fear drives its
anti-corruption efforts. Lower business confidence mean less investment
and trade which means lower growth, and hence greater discontent.
that growth has absolute priority, the government has been more
proactive in its anti-corruption efforts here. This is largely due to
the fact that foreign firms, investors, and governments come into
contact with the above mentioned CCP-linked entities. If China’s
economic actors, and by extension the government is seen as corrupt and
unwilling to tackle those who wrong foreign actors, business confidence
will sink. Beijing cannot allow this to occur, and this fear drives its
anti-corruption efforts. Lower business confidence mean less investment
and trade which means lower growth, and hence greater discontent.
Anti-Corruption Efforts in China Going Forward
As for an anti-corruption time line, I would argue that China will continue apace with its efforts. Since China’s opening in the 1980s
its main focus has been stamping out corruption in the economy,
specifically the elements that deal with foreign economic activity. This
area will continue to be China’s main immediate focus. This will be
trickier as more economic activity is conducted by non-state
corporations. Consequently, China will need to increase efforts to
enshrine a culture of corporate responsibility as well create efficient
regulatory mechanisms.
its main focus has been stamping out corruption in the economy,
specifically the elements that deal with foreign economic activity. This
area will continue to be China’s main immediate focus. This will be
trickier as more economic activity is conducted by non-state
corporations. Consequently, China will need to increase efforts to
enshrine a culture of corporate responsibility as well create efficient
regulatory mechanisms.
With
regards to the first category of corruption, this ties into China’s
larger domestic stability efforts. Any egregious sources of public
discontent will be dealt with post-haste, while the government will
continue to slowly implement systemic reforms to even longstanding
policies, as seen with its recent alterations to the one-child policy,
itself a major source of corruption.
regards to the first category of corruption, this ties into China’s
larger domestic stability efforts. Any egregious sources of public
discontent will be dealt with post-haste, while the government will
continue to slowly implement systemic reforms to even longstanding
policies, as seen with its recent alterations to the one-child policy,
itself a major source of corruption.
The
government walks a fine line in that it seeks to increase
accountability and transparency in select areas, while attempting to
prevent public curiosity and calls for openness penetrating where
Beijing benefits from obfuscation. Ideally, Beijing looks to states such
as Singapore which enjoy ultra-low levels of corruption, high
transparency, and efficiency ratings, yet still maintain social and
political control via a firm hand on the reins of government.
government walks a fine line in that it seeks to increase
accountability and transparency in select areas, while attempting to
prevent public curiosity and calls for openness penetrating where
Beijing benefits from obfuscation. Ideally, Beijing looks to states such
as Singapore which enjoy ultra-low levels of corruption, high
transparency, and efficiency ratings, yet still maintain social and
political control via a firm hand on the reins of government.
Originally written for Freedom Observatory